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The main purpose of this paper is to propose an alternative way of explaining  – within the 
bargaining theory framework  – the stylised fact of flat wages and employment bearing all 
the adjustment to shocks. Standard models predict this behaviour under the assumptions of 
a constant elasticity production function and a reservation wage independent of shocks. 
Once the latter is removed, however, the result holds no more. The proposed two-stage 
model, in which the second stage involves negotiations over employment after the state of 
nature is revealed, would allow to recover it as a consequence of the uncertainty agents face 
when bargaining over wages in the first stage. The model nests other formulations and 
allows for Pareto efficient and inefficient outcomes, depending on union power,  agents' 
beliefs and the observed state of nature.  
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When doing empirical research, the choice of the theoretical model is a quite important 
matter, as the use of a non-adequate framework may distort the results obtained or at least 
confound the conclusions at which one arrives. Multi-stage models appear in this context as 
a good strategy in order not to impose some unnecessary restrictions on the way 
negotiations are carried out. Another interesting issue relates to the fact that uncertainty is 
commonly observed in all situations in which a conflict between negotiating parties may 
arise. As a consequence, it seems natural to include it in a model of bargaining and ask 
which would be the theoretically expected outcomes in a two-stage bargaining model. One 
of the predictions obtained in models under certainty is that wages would be sticky while 
employment would fluctuate when there are fluctuations in demand, which is also an 
observed stylised fact. However, not all labour markets have worked in this way, so that 
proposing a model in which  the result would be observed under certain circumstances 
shows up as appealing.  
 
The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative explanation of wages and employment 
fluctuations within the framework of the bargaining process between unions and 
management
2. In many economies, it is often observed that employment bears most of the 
adjustment to shocks while wages are relatively rigid. The result is justified in terms of the 
insider-outsider approach, as due to the bargaining power unionised workers have.  
However, its validity relies on both the elasticity of demand and the reservation wage being 
constant. The issue addressed in the paper is how to recover the observed stylised fact once 
the latter assumption is removed, although the former is kept. The proposed answer is 
linked to agents facing uncertainty on the future evolution of the economy when bargaining 
over the wage. Hence, expectations would be in the root of different possible patterns 
characterising the evolution of wages and employment.  
 
                                                 
1 I gratefully acknowledge comments from John Driffill, Alvaro Forteza, Robin Naylor, Andrew 
Oswald and Marcel Vaillant. The usual disclaimer holds. 
2 The other two standard approaches are the efficiency wages and the implicit contracts theories.   2
The b argaining models proposed in the literature postulate that unions maximise the utility 
of their members. The individual utility function depends on the bargained wage for those 
that remain employed and on the alternative income that the worker would receive if fired 
for those that lose their job (what the individual can earn working at another firm and/or the 
unemployment benefit). This alternative wage is assumed fixed or given. The assumption, 
although simplifying, is not very reliable if the economy is s ubject to external shocks. If 
shocks have an impact on the whole economy, no matter how centralised/decentralised 
bargaining is, the hypothesis is not sustainable. The probability of finding a job will change 
with the observed state of nature and so will t he expected pay. If negotiations are at the 
industry level, it is still an implausible assumption, as even sectoral shocks would have 
externalities that spill over to the whole economy. Only if bargaining takes place at a very 
decentralised level, say the  firm, and the shock is specific to one or few sectors, might the 
hypothesis of fixed reservation wage be reliable. 
 
The consequences of the assumption are not negligible when analysing the reaction of 
bargained wages and employment to shocks. Once it is removed, the widely studied pattern 
of constant wage and employment that bears all the adjustment to shocks (Blanchard and 
Fischer, 1993) no longer holds. Instead, wages would vary with shocks, as they are a mark-
up over the now variable reservation wage while employment would be more or less flat. 
 
The role of uncertainty has been discussed mainly in the framework of the implicit 
contracts theory. Stable wages along the economic cycle are the result of workers being risk 
averse, so that they would prefer lower wages in good states of nature but higher levels of 
pay in downturns. However, even if the need of insurance were absent from the union's 
objective function, there could be other explanations for the inclusion of uncertainty in the 
bargaining process. A ssuming negotiations over wages have a fixed deadline and that 
unions care about employment, the possibility of a changing economic environment during 
the period in which the wage is fixed would induce uncertainty. Unless there is an explicit 
agreement on  how will employment vary, the firm may unilaterally change its level when a 
shock takes place. Hence, agents would want to make use of any available information on 
the future state of nature when setting the wage.  In order to do so, they must assign a   3
probability to the occurrence of 'good' and 'bad' states, thus allowing their beliefs to alter 
the outcome of bargaining. Negotiations would not be contingent on future economic 
performance or employment but the probability distribution of shocks would play a  role in 
wage bargaining. 
 
The above mechanism could be thought of in the framework of multi-level bargaining. 
Wage negotiations would be done first, taking into account possible effects on employment. 
In a second stage, after the shock is observed, bargaining could take place over 
employment, possibly at a different level (such as the firm).  
 
How would expectations influence the outcome of bargaining under the above hypotheses? 
When agents are optimistic, the expected rents to be shared are large and the probability of 
losing a job is small. Further, outside opportunities should be large and/or the income one 
could get should be high. Then it is quite possible that the union pushes up the wage more 
than if it had to worry about its members keeping their jobs. On the contrary, when a 'bad' 
shock is likely, moderate wage demands should be expected. Hence, the magnitude of wage 
variations will depend on the distribution of shocks, although not on their realisation. 
 
Little work has been done along this line but there are some notable exceptions. Oswald 
(1982) proved that including uncertainty in a monopoly union model does not change its 
qualitative predictions, no matter which is the variable in the objective function agents are 
uncertain about.  However, changes in the degree of uncertainty do modify the optimum 
wage. Another paper is Naish's (1988) in which the union is uncertain as to what price level 
will prevail when setting the wage in a monopoly union model. It is shown that the choice 
of the wage is linked to the shape of the utility function of the union and to the distribution 
of the price level. Hence, the degree of confidence on the price forecast would play a role in 
determining wages.  
 
Before developing the model itself, it is worth to summarise two particular points that have 
been extensively discussed in the literature and that will be used in this paper. Firstly, it is 
quite generally agreed that the specification of the utility function maximised by the union   4
with a kink at full employment of m embers, as proposed by Carruth and Oswald (1987) is 
adequate
3. The assumption of flat indifference curves when all members are employed 
would explain why some unions are not concerned about employment at some point.  
Further, it emphasises the importance o f the determination of membership for modelling 
purposes while it is a suitable benchmark to understand why sometimes, but not always, the 
outcome of bargaining is on the labour demand curve.  
 
Secondly, an extensively discussed issue is that of the efficiency of the wage-employment 
optimum pair
4. While early models assuming the firm has the right-to-manage imply that 
the outcome is not Pareto-optimal, efficient contracts models impose efficiency but on the 
assumption that employment and wages are negotiated simultaneously. However, the 
empirical evidence renders the inclusion of employment in the bargaining agenda quite 
implausible, at least when bargaining is not fully decentralised. Further, if it were included 
it is rarely considered as an issue to be negotiated over at the same time or with the same 
weight than over wages. Some authors have proposed different ways of avoiding the 
theoretical dilemma of inefficiency. The specification of bargaining as a repeated game 
(Espinoza and Rhee, 1989) is one alternative. Efficiency, according to this formulation, 
would depend on the discount rate agents use to calculate the present value of their 
expected utility. Another possibility is to postulate that although there is no explicit 
bargaining over employment, unions do negotiate indirectly by establishing manning 
practices (Johnson, 1990). Other authors have proposed a similar hypothesis, based on the 
idea that being bargaining a repeated interaction, it could be implicitly agreed that the 
outcome has to be efficient and that to prevent agents to cheat it is just needed that the 
punishment for future negotiations is hard enough  (Schultz, 1994). A final option is that of 
multistage models (Manning, 1987), in which it is assumed that wages are set in a first 
stage w ith a given bargaining power while in a second stage employment is determined.  
This could be thought of as a relatively simple proposal, nesting other formulations without 
restricting their outcome to be efficient or inefficient. The issue is thus left as a hypothesis 
to be verified empirically.  However, sometimes their analytical complexity renders them 
                                                 
3 See textbooks as Booth (1995) or Pencavel (1991). 
4 The topic has been included in textbooks as the ones cited in the previous footnote. See also 
Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991).   5
intractable at a general level, so that very simplifying assumptions on the technology and/or 
the union's utility function have to be made to draw conclusions.  
 
In what follows a model incorporating the elements discussed above will be proposed. Its 
main implication is that the stylised fact of flat wages and fluctuating employment can be 
recovered, once the assumption of constant reservation wage is removed, by incorporating 
uncertainty in bargaining.  It will be shown that the pattern is not the only possible one to 
observe and that it is not the consequence of union power itself, as in Manning (1987), but 
of the impossibility of fully anticipate the state of nature that will prevail. 
 
The model is developed incorporating uncertainty at the outset. However, the analogous 
result in the case of fully anticipated shocks (no uncertainty) is also derived. After 
describing the assumptions involved and the outcomes of bargaining obtained, the 
implications on wage rigidity are discussed. Finally, the efficiency of the outcomes and 
how the model nests other formulations are presented.  
 
A model with uncertainty and varying outside opportunities  
Bargaining is assumed to take place between one union and one employer or association of 
employers. The union represents a given percentage of the total workforce. Negotiations are 
carried out in two stages. In the first stage wages are determined, while in the second the 
employment level is set.  The structure of bargaining is such that at each stage a sequence 
of offers and counteroffers occurs until an agreement is reached depending on the relative 
bargaining powers of the parties, so that the generalised Nash bargaining s olution applies 
(Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986). Union and management maximise utility 
functions defined over wages and employment. It is assumed that the objective function of 
the union has a 'kink' point at employment equal to membership as proposed by Carruth and 
Oswald (1987). Management maximises profits that do not include adjustment costs of 
employment and the production function is concave. A demand shock to the economy takes 
place before negotiations over employment. It is assumed that the shock can be of one of 
two types,  'good' (qg) or 'bad' (qb). The shock alters the revenue product and the reservation 
wage. Prices are normalised to unity.    6
The optimisation problem in the first stage is solved conditionally on its effects over the 
second stage of bargaining. The problem can be expressed in the following way:  
 
      Stage 1:   Max F1 = Eq[(G - G0)]
aEq[(P - P0)]
1-a 
                       w 
 
      Stage 2:   Max F2 = (G - G0)
b(P - P0)
1-b 
                        L 
               
Where  Eq is t he expected value operator;  q is the shock;  G(w,L,M,r) is the union's utility 
function;  w is the wage;  L is the employment level; r = r(q) is the reservation wage; M is 
membership; G0 = Mu(r) is the fall-back position of the union; u(·) is  the  utility function of 
the individual member;  P(w,L,q) is the value of  profits for the firm and  P0  its fall-back 
position that will be assumed to be zero (no production and no operating costs); while  a 
and b are the bargaining powers of  the  union  in the first and second stage of negotiations, 
respectively. Two cases can be distinguished. First, when the shock is fully anticipated by 
the parties, so that the expected utilities are equal to their actual values
5. Second, when it is 
common knowledge to the parties that  the shock will occur but there is no full anticipation 
of its value. The assumption to be used is that both parties assign the same probability to 
the two possible realisations - 'good' or 'bad'. The probability of observing a 'good' shock is 
p and, as there are only two states of nature, agents assign a probability of (1-p) to the event 
of a 'bad' shock. In this case the optimisation problem in the first stage takes place in an a 
priori unknown state of nature. Note that the case in which the shock is fully anticipated by 
the parties is the result of p being equal to 1 or to 0. 
The specification of the utility functions is such that:  
 
Gi(w,Li,M,ri) = Li [u(w) - u(ri)] + Mu(ri)      if    Li < M  
Gi(w,Li,M,ri) = Mu(w)                                  if    Li ‡ M  
Pi(w,Li,qi ) = qif(Li ) - wLi                  "Li 
 
With:  ¶u/¶w = u'w ‡ 0      ri  = r(qi)    ¶r/¶qi = ri' ‡ 0   and    i = g, b 
                                                 
5 This is equivalent to postulating that the shock takes place before bargaining over the wage level.   7
  
The utility function of an employed union member is u(w) while u(ri) is that of an 
unemployed union member. The reservation wage  -  r  - is assumed to be a linear non-
decreasing function of the shock. If the shock is to the economy, what is being postulated is 
that good states of nature would increase  -or keep constant- the expected income to be 
obtained in other activities. Sectoral shocks might have the opposite effect, though. 
The expected utility functions are:  
 
Eq(G - G0) =  pLg[u(w) -u(rg)] + (1-p)Lb[u(w) -u(rb)]          if    Li < M  
Eq(G - G0) =  pM[u(w) -u(rg)] + (1-p)M[u(w) -u(rb)]            if   Li ‡ M  
Eq(P - P0) = p[qgf(Lg) -wLg] + (1-p) [qbf(Lb) -wLb]         "Li 
           rg  = r(qg)     r b  = r(qb)        
 
The outcome of the two-stage bargaining is obtained by backwards induction: first the level 
of employment - Li
*(w
*, b, qi) for i = g, b - is obtained in the second stage. The resulting 
expression is substituted into the utility functions in order to solve for the optimum wage 
level - w
*(a, p, qi, ri) - in the first stage.  
 
The first order condition (f.o.c.) for the second stage problem  - generally known as the rent 
division curve (RDC) - is:  
    bP/(G - G0) = - (1-b)PL/(G-G0)L 
The conditional solution for the first stage maximisation problem is given by: 
 
    b(1-a)Eq[Pw]/Eq[(G-G0)w] =  a(1-b)Eq[(G-G0)PL/(G-G0)L]/Eq(G-G0) 
 
The second order condition for a maximum in the second stage optimisation problem holds. 
That for the first stage problem holds for risk-neutral and risk-averse players. If workers are 
risk loving, on the other hand, some additional restrictions ought to be satisfied.   8
Given the definition of the utility function of the union, two cases have to be distinguished. 
Firstly, that in which shocks and bargaining are such that the resulting changes in 
employment maintain its level below membership (Li
*< M) no matter the shock is 'good' or 
'bad'.  Secondly, the case in which the optimum level of employment bargained is equal to 
or greater than the number of members (Li
*‡ M).  
 
Case I:  L
* < M   "q 
The f.o.c. for the second and first stage optimisation problems can be respectively re-
written given the assumed utility functions as: 
 
w
*  =   bqi f(Li )/Li + (1-b)qi fL(Li )        i = g,b            (1) 
 
w
* =                      a(1-b)Eq(qfLL){Eq[Luw] + Eq[(u(w) – u(r))Lw]}                      -   
           a(1-b)Eq(L){Eq[Luw]+Eq[(u(w)–u(r))Lw]}–b(1-a)Eq{[u(w)–u(r)]L}Eq(Lw) 
 
   -                             b(1-a)Eq{[u(w)–u(r)]L}Eq[qLwfL- L]                                (2)                                                                                  
    a(1-b)Eq(L){Eq[Luw]+Eq[(u(w)–u(r))Lw]}–b(1-a)Eq{[u(w)–u(r)]L}Eq(Lw) 
 
 
Case II:  L
* ‡  M   "q 
 
If  G = Mu(w)     ￿    G - G0 =  M[u(w) -u(r)]  and ¶(G - G0)/ ¶L = 0 
 
Hence the f.o.c. for the second stage problem is just PL = 0  and b has no influence on the 
employment level. Being all union members employed, unions should not care about the 
employment level. The results in this case, following the same steps as before, are: 
 
    w
* = qi fL(Li )        i = g,b           (3) 
    w
* = Eq[qf(L)]/Eq(L) – [(1-a)/a]Eq[u(w)–u(r)]/uw     (4) 
 
Comparing equations (1) and (3) it is seen that for a given wage level, rule I determines a 
higher level of employment than that stemming from the use of rule II. The result is the   9
expected one if there are unemployed members and unions care about and bargain over 
employment.  
 
It could be the case that the above two rules do not cover all possible situations. One could 
imagine that the shock is such that L
* > M if rule I is used and L
* < M if rule II is used. If 
this were the case, it would be sensible to assume that the union would bargain conditional 
on full employment of its members (L
* = M), so that rule II should be used. This yields the 
following optima: 
 
Case III:  L
* = M    "q 
Li
* = M             (5) 
w
*
  =  Eq(q)f(M)/M - (1- a)/aEq(r)      (6) 
 
Equations (1) to (6) show that bargained wages depend on the distribution of shocks, while 
the negotiated employment level depends also on the realisation of the shock, except for 
Case III, in which employment is fixed at membership. Thus, wages would be rigid and 
employment would bear most of the  adjustment to shocks. But this is so due to the shock 
not being fully anticipated and not because of a fixed reservation wage. As agents are 
uncertain as to what state of nature they will face, wage claims will be somewhere in 
between the levels that would be accepted if the 'bad'/'good' character of the shock were 
known. The point is illustrated in Figure 1 comparing the results with those stemming from 
both an efficient contract and a two-stage bargaining model with no uncertainty when 
employment is below membership. The additional assumptions used are that union 
members are risk-neutral; the utility function of the union is utilitarian; and the production 
function of the firm is quasi Cobb-Douglas. The expressions for i= g,b are thus:  
 
u(wi) = wi   ;  Gi(wi,Li,M,ri) - G0  = Li (wi - ri)  ;  f(Li) = Li
g  ;  Pi(wi,Li,qi ) = qiLi
g - wiLi       
Li
*={[(a+g(1-a))/g(b+g(1-b))][Eq(Lr)/qiEq(L)]}
1/(g-1)   
w
*  = {[a+g(1-a)]/g}[Eq(Lr)/Eq(L)]            10






































K is the ratio Eq(Lr)/Eq(L), so that w
*(K) is the optimum wage under uncertainty in Case I. 
Lb
D, Lg
D are the labour demand curves after a 'bad' and a 'good' shock, respectively. CCb, 
CCg  are the corresponding contract curves, while 2SCCb, 2SCCg are possible two-stage 
contract curves in the event of 'bad' and 'good' shocks, respectively. Points B and G are the 
employment-wage optimum pairs that would result after a 'bad'/'good' shock with no 
uncertainty ( p=0/p=1), while BU and GU would be the outcomes of a model with 
uncertainty  (0<p<1). Results are unchanged if  Case II is used instead. The 2SCC collapses   11




Being the wage set at a value in between those expected under certainty, employment will 
vary more than it would if the shock were fully anticipated. The result is thus analogous to 
that obtained if assuming a fixed reservation w age, the reasons behind it being however 
very different. 
 
How much would employment adjust to shocks? It would depend -given the above- on the 
distribution of shocks, that is, on the ability agents have in foreseeing the future state of 
nature. When the distributional variance is small, agents are quite certain they will face a 
'good'/'bad' state of nature (pﬁ1/ pﬁ 0). If their beliefs turn out to be 'correct', the effect on 
the employment level could not be stated  a priori, as the positive/negative effect  of the 
shock could be offset by the increase/decrease in the wage level.  However, if the shock 
turns out to be of the opposite sign to that expected by agents ( qb/qg), all the adjustment 
would be born by the employment level. On the other hand, when uncertainty is at its 
maximum ( p=1/2), employment will bear most of the adjustment no matter the sign of the 
observed shock. 
 
The above can be summarised in the following proposition:  
 
Proposition  
In a two-stage bargaining model where shocks take place after  negotiating wages, the 
elasticity of demand is constant and the reservation wage is a non-decreasing function of 
the state of nature, the extent up to which employment adjusts to shocks will be determined 
by agents' expectations, the realised state of nature and its effect on the reservation wage. 
 
How will changes in the distribution of shocks and in the reservation wage affect the 
outcome of bargaining?  Although it is not possible to derive unconditionally the effects of 
                                                 
6 The optimum wage according to rule II is always higher than that resulting from rule I under the 
assumption of mean independence of L and r: wI
* = {[a+g(1-a)]/g}Eq(r) £ [g(1-a)/(g-a)]Eq(r) = wII
*.   12
changes in every parameter, some  results can be stated. Table 1 shows the sign of the 
relevant derivatives, their explicit expressions being included in the appendix for the 
example that is being considered.  
 
Table 1 Changes in the optimum wage and employment levels 
Derivative  Case I  Case II   Case III 
¶w*/¶ri   +  +  + 
¶w*/¶p    +  +  + 
¶w*/¶qg   +  +  + 
¶w*/¶qb   ?  +  + 
¶Li*/¶ri    -  -  0 
¶Li*/¶rj    -  -  0 
¶Li*/¶p    -  -  0 
¶Li*/¶qi   -   iff C1  -   iff C1  0 
¶Lg*/¶qb  -   iff C2  -  0 
¶Lb*/¶qg  -  -  0 
      Condition C1 is: (¶w*/¶qi)(qi/w*) > 1 
          Condition C2 is: ¶w*/¶qb ‡ 0 
 
Being a mark-up over the reservation wage, the optimum wage bargained rises and the 
employment level falls whenever there is an exogenous increase in the alternative income. 
Further, changes in the value of  'good' and 'bad' shocks would in turn influence the value of 
the reservation wage, thus reinforcing their direct effect.  
 
If there are unemployed members and agents become more optimistic (increases in  p) or if 
the possible states of nature improve (increases in  qg and/or qb), the optimum wage will be 
set at a higher level, although in the latter case this will depend on the relative magnitude of 
the alternative wage under both states of nature. Thus, a distribution of shocks with a bigger 
mean (more to the right) will generate increases in the wage bargained, no matter what the   13
change in the distributional variance is
7. Unfortunately, the effects of changes in the 
variance, for a fixed distributional mean, on the outcome cannot be derived analytically. 
Some preliminary simulations were carried out but the results obtained were not 
conclusive. While increases in the variance due to a rise in p from 0 to 0.5 with fixed e have 
a positive effect on the optimum wage, when  p decreases from 1 to 0.5 the result will 
depend on the  value of the parameters defining the utility function of agents. Thus, further 
work needs to be done in this area.  
 
The level of employment bargained at the second stage will depend also on the realisation 
of the shock.  Given a 'good' state of nature, employment will fall with increases in the 
probability assigned by agents to 'good' shocks. A rise in the value of qg, on the other hand, 
may result in a decrease or an increase in employment, depending on the change of the 
optimum wage relative to that of t he shock (more or less than proportional).  The same 
results are derived for realisations of 'bad' sates of nature. However, a rise in  qg implies a 
decrease in employment if the observed shock turns out to be 'bad', while a rise in  qb 
generates a decline in employment when the actual shock is 'good' only if it raises the wage.  
 
Whether there are unemployed members or not will not change the direction of the above 
variations but their magnitude. As employment is not an argument in the objective function 
of  the union when all members have a job, the wage level set and its rate of change will be 
always higher in this case than otherwise.  
 
The model do invite for further developments, especially those related to its dynamic 
aspects. A first possible way of introducing dynamics would be to assume shocks are 
specific stochastic processes. If a sequence of periods is considered and bargaining with the 
timing proposed is assumed to take place in each period, states of nature that are not time-
homogenous would result in wages being time dependent. If the stochastic process has  
                                                 
7The mean value and the variance of the distribution are: qm = pqg + (1-p)qb;   
V(q) = p(1- p)e
2   with  e = (qg - qb)     
   14
'memory'  (shocks are not independent) there is also scope for persistent effects on 
employment. The model can be expressed, oversimplifying, as: 
 
          wt
* = a0 + a1Et-1(rt)      Lt
* = b0 + b1qt - b2wt
* 
 
If  E t-1(qt) = qm,t   and   Et-1(rt) = rm,t  , then w
* would not  be  constant  anymore when  
agents  are  assumed  to  take  into  account  all  the  past   relevant information. Wages are 
not responsive to the realisation of the shock, b ut as states of nature have a different 
distributional mean, employment adjustment might be smoother than otherwise. Moreover, 
if states were autocorrelated, the past history would influence directly the outcome: 
 
      qt = lqt-1 + e t    E t-1(qt) = lqt-1     and   Et-1(rt) = hrt-1      
￿  wt
* = a0 + a1hrt-1         Lt
* = b0 + b1lqt-1 - b2wt
* + b1e t   
￿  b1lqt-1 = lLt-1
*
 - lb0  + b2lwt-1
*     ￿    Lt
* = b0(1-l) - b2lwt
* + b2lwt-1
* +l Lt-1
* + b1e t     
 
Further extensions could be analysed under different assumptions.  If the distribution of 
shocks is not known but should be forecasted instead, the behaviour of the variables used to 
predict the parameters and/or past realisations of shocks would influence the outcome. A 
Bayesian approach could also be considered in a multi-period framework, so that agents 
would update their subjective beliefs using all the available information and thus generate 
dynamics. 
 
Fully anticipated shocks 
If there were no uncertainty and outside opportunities depended on the realisation of the 
shock, the set of outcomes (2), (4) and (6) would be the following: 
 
wi
* = qi fL(Li )  +           b(1-a)Li[u(wi) – u (ri)]                           i = g,b    (2)'           
             a(1-b)u'(wi)Li + (a-b)[u(wi) – u(ri)]Lw 
 
wi
* = qif(Li)/(Li) – [(1-a)/a][u(wi)–u(ri)]/uw     i = g,b        (4)' 
   15
wi
*
  = aqif(M)/M + (1-a)ri         i = g,b            (6)' 
 
Equation (2)' is the two-stages contract curve (2SCC) as derived in Manning (1987). The 
bargaining outcomes in this case clearly show that wage stickiness will not be observed, 
being the magnitude of its adjustment dependant on how the alternative income is affected 
by shocks. Employment might then fluctuate less, as the positive/negative impact of shocks 
will be partially offset by the relative increase/decrease in the wage level. This could mean 
that, in the event of a 'good' shock for example, the employment level could remain 
unaltered or even decrease, depending on the ratio  rg/qg.  The shock shifts the RDC curve 
and the 2SCC to the right. An increase in the reservation wage, on the other hand, does not 
move the RDC but causes the 2SCC to shift in. Hence, with shocks altering the reservation 
wage the final result on the 2SCC cannot be asserted  a priori.  The result is depicted in 
Figure 2 using the same simple example as before.  
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The figure is drawn assuming  a=b (so that the two-stage model is equivalent to the 
efficient contracts formulation). Point A describes  the initial wage-employment optimum 
pair, with reservation wage  r0, labour demand curve  L0
D, rent division curve RDC0  and 
contract curve CC0. Point A' shows the optimum pair after the occurrence of a 'good' shock 
q that shifts the labour demand curve to L1
D and the rent division curve to RDC1 but does 
not affect the reservation wage. Point B is the optimum pair that would result if the shock 
affects the reservation wage, so that its new level is  r1. Point C is the optimum pair that 
would result if the impact of the shock on the reservation wage were such that its new level 
was r2. 
 
The behaviour of wages and employment in the different cases analysed - L
* ‡ M, L
*< M - 
is almost analogous to the one resulting from a 2 -stages model with constant reservation 
wage, as in Manning (1987), that is, higher mark-up of  w over r and smaller employment 
level for each wage when bargaining takes place according to the rule prevailing for L
*‡M 
than when L
*< M . With constant  r, wages will always be higher when there is full 
employment of members than when there are members unemployed. Although the result is 
what one would expect, it is often observed in some economies that although 
unemployment is high, wage increases do not slow down. The model proposed here would 
give an explanation that is quite plausible around the point at which  L
* = M. 'Good' shocks 
when there are unemployed members might generate a higher wage level compared to the 
one got in a 'bad' state of nature with full employment of members, provided the difference 
between the reservation wages in both states is big enough: 
 
            wb
*(L‡M) £ wg




Higher wages with a lower employment level in 'good' states relative to the values observed 
in a 'bad' state could be possible, given the above, as a consequence of the bargaining 
process. The odds of observing such result increase with the reaction of the reservation 
wage to shocks. 
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The above situation links the character of the shock with the preferences of the union in  a 
way such that it can explain why unions seem to react differently when employment is to be 
increased than when it is to be lowered. In 'good' states wages will rise more than in 'bad' 
states, thus allowing that employment could even remain unchanged in t he former situation 
while in the latter the decrease in the number of jobs could be less significant. Economies 
and/or sectors in which most employees are unionised could be thought of as being well 
described by this case, since increases in the employment level would always mean hiring 
non-members while decreases in the number of workers would be linked to firing members. 
Hence, 'good' shocks would always generate relative wage inflation and employment 
stagnation while 'bad' shocks would be accompanied by  moderate wage increases and a 
relatively smaller employment adjustment.  
 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the three cases that have been defined along the paper -
depending on employment being less than, equal to, or greater than membership- can be re-
stated for the example used in terms of the relative magnitude of q and r(q)
8:     
Case I:   qi/ri £  [a + g(1-a)]M
(1-g)/g[b + g(1-b)]                       
Case II:  qi/ri > (1-a)/(g-a)]M
(1-g)                       
Case III:     [a + g(1-a)]M
(1-g)/g[b+ g(1-b)] £  qi/ri < (1-a)/(g-a)]M
(1-g)  
 
Rephrasing the problem in this way what is being defined are two thresholds for  q that 
would determine employment being smaller or greater than membership. This allows one to 
think of an asymmetric behaviour of unions depending on the magnitude of exogenous 
shocks. There is a zone in between both values, however, that is not determined. There is 
thus an economic environment in which unions would bargain subject to all members 
having a job (Case III).   
 
Efficiency of the outcomes  
The proposed formulation allows for different results depending not only on the bargaining 
power of the parties at the two stages of negotiations but also on the evolution of the 
reservation wage after the shock.  
                                                 
8 Alvaro Forteza kindly suggested this point to me.   18
 
The outcome of bargaining would be efficient whenever the isoprofit and the indifference 
curves are tangent, that is, when the following equality holds:  
 






With the assumed utility function of the individual member the above equation  becomes: 
qifL(Li
*) =  ri . Assuming a quasi-Cobb-Douglas production function and a utilitarian 
objective function for the union, the conditions under which an efficient outcome is 
obtained can be stated for Cases I and II. In  Case III the outcome will not be efficient by 
construction.  
 
Case I:  L
* < M    "q 
(w
*, L
*) is efficient  iff  {[a+g(1-a)]/[b+g(1-b)]}[Eq(Lr)/Eq(L)] =  ri      i = g,b    
 
If the reservation wage is an increasing function of the shock -an assumption that would not 
necessarily hold if decentralised bargaining is considered or if shocks are sector specific- 
then:  
                                rb  £  Eq(Lr)/Eq(L)  £  rg      
 
This implies a different necessary condition depending on the nature of the actual shock:  
 
If  q = qg :    {[a+g(1-a)]/g[b+g(1-b)]}[Eq(Lr)/Eq(L)] =  rg     
￿  [a+g(1-a)]/g[b+g(1-b)] ‡ 1  ￿   a ‡ b 
 
If  q = qb :    {[a+g(1-a)]/g[b+g(1-b)]}[Eq(Lr)/Eq(L)] =  rb     
￿  [a+g(1-a)]/g[b+g(1-b)] £ 1  ￿   a £ b 
 
Hence, if there are unemployed members but still the bargaining p ower of the union over 
wages is greater than over employment, efficient outcomes can only be observed in 'good'   19
states. If the opposite holds, efficiency can be attained only in 'bad' states, while if 
bargaining powers are equal in the two rounds of negotiations the outcome can be efficient 
when shocks are both 'good' and 'bad'. Since the expected reservation wage is always 
greater than that observed in a fully anticipated 'bad' state of nature, and the mark-up over it 
is greater than 1 if bargaining power over wages is higher than over employment and there 
are members unemployed, the union/firm could have always been better off, without 
negatively affecting the other party, bargaining a smaller wage and getting a higher 
employment level in the second stage  if a 'bad' shocks takes place. However, if the shock 
turns out to be 'good', there is still the chance that the output is efficient, given the 
combined effect of shocks and wage level on the level of employment and hence on the 
level of benefits. The analogous reasoning applies to the case in which bargaining power 
over employment is greater than over wages. 
 
The result is different from that obtained in Manning's (1987) two-stage model. While there 
the sufficient condition for efficiency is  a=b, in the present formulation it is not the only 
one, because of agents bargaining over wages subject to the expected shock and its effects 
on the reservation wage. Further, the same argument allows for Pareto optimality also when 
a„b, so that inefficiencies would arise not only because of different bargaining powers as 
in the cited paper but also depending on the state of nature in which employment 
negotiations take place and on how 'correctly' agents are able to predict it. 
 
Finally, underemployment is observed when t he marginal labour product exceeds the 
competitive wage and if this difference is negative there is overemployment. Assuming that 
the alternative income is a good approximation to the above competitive wage, one can 
draw some conclusions by analysing the m odel's optima. When union power in negotiating 
wages is greater than or equal to that when bargaining over employment (a>b) and a 'bad' 
shock takes place ( q=qb) overemployment is not possible, while if  a£b and  q=qg 
underemployment cannot be observed. However, for the combination of  a>b and q=qg and 
for  a£b and  q=qb both results are possible. The latter conclusion differs from the one 
arising from a two-stage model with no uncertainty in which underemployment will 
necessarily occur when a>b and overemployment only in the opposite situation.    20
 
Case II:  L
* ‡ M   "q 
 




*) is efficient  iff [g(1-a)/(g-a)]Eq(r)  = ri          i = b,g       
 
Given that [g(1-a)/(g-a)] ‡ 1 "a - the mark-up over the reservation wage is always greater 
than 1 - efficiency could only be attained in 'good' states if rb £ rg holds. Moreover, in 'bad' 
states there will always be underemployment. This result is the consequence of the union 
not caring about employment when all members have a job. However, it should be assumed 
that firms faced with a 'bad' shock are laying off non-union members first. On the contrary, 
in 'good' states it is possible to observe both over and underemployment, depending on the 
probabilities assigned to each state of nature, the bargaining power over wages and the 
elasticity of output with respect to employment.  
 
Summarising, the main results on efficiency relate to the possibility of obtaining Pareto 
optimality of the outcome without imposing that the union's bargaining power over wages 
and employment should be equal.  The conditions under which efficiency is possible 
depend, however, on the nature of the shock, the existence or not of unemployed union 
members and on the accuracy of agents' predictions.  
 
 
Nesting existing models  
For different combinations of the values of the parameters of the proposed model, various 
standard formulations are derived. Firstly, if the probability of occurrence of a 'good' shock 
is set equal to 1 or 0, the formulation becomes the two-stage model with varying outside 
opportunities sketched previously. That is, the case in which the shock is fully anticipated.  
 
If it is further assumed that the reservation wage is independent of shocks, the standard 
two-stage m odel results. Note, however, that this same model can be obtained if keeping   21
uncertainty but with a constant reservation wage and a production function with constant 
elasticity.  
 
Adding the assumption that bargaining powers are equal in both stages determines that the 
model collapses to the efficient contracts formulation while if  b is set equal to 0 the right-
to-manage model is obtained. Finally, imposing the restrictions that  b=0 and  a=1, the 
model becomes the monopoly union.  
 
As stated in Manning (1987), the advantages of having a general formulation are obvious. 
In encompassing different possible bargaining structures, it allows for testing, instead of 
imposing, the restrictions that would yield a simpler model. However, it must be noted that 
there might exist identification problems that would severely reduce the practical viability 
of the testing procedures.  
 
Concluding remarks  
The bargaining model proposed in this paper is intended to analyse how standard results 
would be affected by the inclusion  of agents' beliefs and varying outside opportunities. This 
is thought to be relevant not only because of being a better approximation of real world but 
also because of its consequences on the expected behaviour of wages and employment. 
 
The results obtained show that once the alternative income is allowed to vary with shocks, 
wages are not sticky anymore and the employment level fluctuates less than according to 
standard models. If uncertainty is included, however, wage rigidity is recovered while the 
extent of employment fluctuations will depend on the distribution of shocks, their 
realisation and the evolution of the reservation wage. If uncertainty is high and/or if the 
state of nature turns out to be of the opposite sign of the most expected one by agents, the 
employment adjustment is maximum. Observed shocks of the same sign than those 
expected by agents and/or scarce uncertainty generate small employment adjustment to 
shocks. Moreover, the relative responsiveness of wages and employment will depend on the 
existence or not of unemployed members. 
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According to the proposed model, there is not a unique prediction regarding the Pareto 
optimality of the outcome of bargaining. In contrast to other formulations, it allows for both 
efficient and inefficient wage-employment pairs, depending not only on union strength but 
also on agents' beliefs and the observed state of nature. Even if unions were not concerned 
about employment, as many authors claim to be the case, it would be possible to attain 
efficient outcomes when faced to 'good' states of nature in this framework. Thus, the model 
provides a way of overcoming one of the points confronting right-to-manage and efficient 
contracts models.   
 
Further theoretical work must be done, however, analysing how sensitive the results are to 
hypotheses such as the risk neutrality of agents. Given that it is not possible to derive 
analytically the outcome of bargaining when individuals are risk averse, simulations should 
be carried out in order to shed some light on this issue.  
 
Moreover, it would be interesting to compare the results derived with those that would be 
obtained in a setting with decentralised bargaining, especially because the relevant 
reservation wage could evolve differently depending on the shock being sectoral or 
economy-wide.  
 
Finally, given that the predictions of the model regarding employment adjustment depend 
on the responsiveness of the reservation wage to shocks, an interesting extension would be 
to endogenise the alternative income in a general equilibrium model of the labour market. 
Considerations relative to the behaviour of the unemployed individuals  - such as 
effectiveness of their job search; duration of unemployment; or availability of information 
on vacancies- would be thus included. 
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Appendix: Derivatives Table 1 
Case I: L




1/(g-1)  ‡ 0      ¶w
*/¶rb = {[a+g(1-a)]/gA
2}(1-p)qb
1/(g-1)   ‡ 0 
  with   A = pqg
1/(g-1) +  (1-p)qb
1/(g-1) 
¶w
*/¶p  = {[a+g(1-a)]/gA
2}(rg - r b) (qgqb)




















* (2-g)/(g-1) /(g-1)  £ 0    for i,j = g,b    i„j 
¶Li
*/¶p  = [¶w
*/¶p](qim)
1/(g-1) w
















* (2-g)/(g-1) /(g-1)  £ 0     
Case II: L
* ‡ ‡ M    " "q q 
¶w
*/¶rg  = pg(1-a)/(g-a)   ‡ 0     ¶w
*/¶rb  = (1-p)g(1-a)/(g-a)   ‡ 0  
¶w
*/¶p  = (rg - r b) g(1-a)/(g-a)   ‡ 0    
¶w
*/¶qg = (¶rg/¶qg)pg(1-a)/(g-a)  ‡ 0  ¶w
*/¶qb = (¶rb/¶qb)(1-p)g(1-a)/(g-a)  ‡ 0 
¶Li
*/¶ri  = [¶w
*/¶ri](qig)
1/(g-1) w
* (2-g)/(g-1) /(g-1)  £ 0    for i = g,b 
¶Li
*/¶rj  = [¶w
*/¶rj](qig)
1/(g-1) w
*(2-g)/(g-1) /(g-1)  £ 0    for i,j = g,b    i„j 
¶Li
*/¶p  = [¶w
*/¶p](qig)
1/(g-1) w











* (2-g)/(g-1) /(g-1)qi  £ 0       for i = g,b     i„j 
Case III: L
* = M    " "q q 
¶w
*/¶rg = p (1-a)   ‡ 0       ¶w
*/¶r b = (1-p)(1-a)  ‡ 0  
¶w
*/¶p = (rg-r b)(1-a)+(qg-q b)apM
(g-1) ‡ 0     
¶w
*/¶qg= (¶rg/¶qg)p(1-a)+pM




*/¶x  =  0    for x = rg, r b, p, qg, q b  